Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
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DOI：
10.1111/1468-0262.00228
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发表时间：
2001-07
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Bhaskar Dutta;M. Jackson;M. Breton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bhaskar Dutta;M. Jackson;M. Breton
我们研究了候选人的动机，战略性地影响投票程序的结果。我们表明，每个非独裁的投票程序，满足一致性的结果将受到非竞争候选人的激励（即，不能赢得选举的人）通过参加或退出选举来影响选举结果。
We study the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. We show that the outcomes of every nondictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity will be affected by the incentives of noncontending candidates (i.e., who cannot win the election) to influence the outcome by entering or exiting the election.