Separation of CEO and Board : A Comparison of the U . S . and Japan
Separation of CEO and Board : A Comparison of the U . S . and Japan
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.969262
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Meg A. Sato
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Meg A. Sato
本文驳斥了普遍认为管理层与董事会分离是加强董事会监督的必要条件的说法。具体而言，我开发了一个理论模型的董事会和CEO之间的关系，比较两种治理体系，一个是董事会完全由独立董事组成，另一个是董事会由没有独立董事。我证明，在合理的条件下，后一种制度比前一种制度产生更强的监控：首席执行官的私人贝内高于每位董事的薪酬。此外，前一种制度被解释为美国制度，后一种制度是传统的日本制度。这促使我进一步调查为什么日本董事会被声称监督少于美国董事会。笔者从日本的法律的制度和实践出发，对日本的治理制度进行了探讨，从而回答了这个问题。关键词：公司治理;董事会;监督;美国制度;日本传统制度;预期损失本文是根据东京大学经济学研究所的《公司结构与监督：各种公司治理制度的比较》（COME-F-133）的后半部分撰写的。博士学位候选人，东京大学，日本东京。电子邮件：megsato@nifty.com我非常感谢Keiichi Kubota，Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara，Leslie Hannah，Masaki Nakabayashi，Sadakazu Ohsaki，Kong-Pin Chen，Eric Rasmusen和Hiroshi Osano的有益评论。我非常感谢清水孝、神谷和也、伊藤秀史和理查德。感谢布劳恩的宝贵意见和建议，这些意见和建议对我产生了巨大的影响;一如既往，我从他们那里学到了很多东西，贝内匪浅。任何错误都是我自己的。本文发表于2007年8月16日在台北举行的亚洲法律经济学会年会和2007年9月24日在东京举行的日本经济学会年会。
This paper refutes the pervasive claim that the separation of management from the board of directors is necessary to enhance board monitoring. Speci cally, I develop a theoretical model of the relationship between a board and a CEO to compare two governance systems, one in which the board consists entirely of independent directors and the other in which the board consists of no independent directors. I show that the latter system produces stronger monitoring than the former system under a plausible condition: a private bene t of a CEO being higher than a pay of each director. Moreover, the former system is interpreted as the U.S. system and the latter system is the traditional Japanese system. This motivates me to a further investigation of why have Japanese boards been claimed to monitor less than the U.S. boards. I provide an answer to this question by discussing Japanese governance system in light of its legal system and practices. Keywords: Corporate Governance; The Board of Directors; Monitoring; The U.S. System; The Traditional Japanese System; The Expected Loss Leak JEL Codes: G30, K22, P51 This paper is based on the latter half of Corporate Structure and Monitoring: A Comparison of Alternative Systems of Corporate Governance,COE-F-133, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. yPh.D. Candidate, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan. Email: megsato@nifty.com I truly appreciate Keiichi Kubota, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Leslie Hannah, Masaki Nakabayashi, Sadakazu Ohsaki, Kong-Pin Chen, Eric Rasmusen, and Hiroshi Osano for their helpful comments. I am most grateful to Takashi P. Shimizu, Kazuya Kamiya, Hideshi Itoh, and Richard A. Braun for their invaluable advice and suggestions which had made enormous di¤erence to me; as always, I learned a lot and bene ted so much from them. Any errors are my own. zThis paper was presented at 2007 Annual Meeting of Asian Law and Economics Association, Aug.16th, Taipei, and 2007 Annual Meeting of Japanese Economic Association, Sep.24th, Tokyo.