Evolutionary game analysis and regulatory strategies for online group-buying based on system dynamics
Evolutionary game analysis and regulatory strategies for online group-buying based on system dynamics
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DOI：
10.1080/17517575.2017.1412503
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发表时间：
2018-07
影响因子：
4.4
通讯作者：
Zhong-Zhong Jiang-Zhong;Na He;Xuwei Qin;Andrew W. H. Ip;Chun-Ho Wu;K. Yung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhong-Zhong Jiang-Zhong;Na He;Xuwei Qin;Andrew W. H. Ip;Chun-Ho Wu;K. Yung
摘要网络团购的出现为电子商务时代的消费者提供了一种新的消费模式。然而，许多消费者意识到，由于缺乏规范，在团购市场中，自己的利益有时得不到保障。本文旨在为网络团购市场制定有效的监管策略。据我们所知，现有的研究大多假设网络团购市场中的三方，即零售商、团购平台和消费者是完全理性的。为了更好地理解决策过程，在本文中，我们将有限理性的概念纳入考虑。首先，建立了一个三方演化博弈模型，研究了基于有限理性的三方博弈策略。其次，采用系统动力学方法对博弈模型进行整体仿真，分析其稳定性。最后，通过理论分析和大量的计算实验，获得了网络团购市场的管理见解和监管策略。研究结果表明，适当的奖惩措施可以促进网络团购市场的健康发展。
ABSTRACT The emergence of online group-buying provides a new consumption pattern for consumers in e-commerce era. However, many consumers realize that their own interests sometimes can’t be guaranteed in the group-buying market due to the lack of being regulated. This paper aims to develop effective regulation strategies for online group-buying market. To the best of our knowledge, most existing studies assume that three parties in online group-buying market, i.e. the retailer, the group-buying platform and the consumer, are perfectly rational. To better understand the decision process, in this paper, we incorporate the concept of bounded rationality into consideration. Firstly, a three-parties evolutionary game model is established to study each player’s game strategy based on bounded rationality. Secondly, the game model is simulated as a whole by adopting system dynamics to analyze its stability. Finally, theoretical analysis and extensive computational experiments are conducted to obtain the managerial insights and regulation strategies for online group-buying market. Our results clearly demonstrate that a suitable bonus-penalty measure can promote the healthy development of online group-buying market.