Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories
Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories
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候选人动机：替代理论的综合
DOI：
--
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发表时间：
1983
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
D. Wittman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Wittman
一个正式的选举行为模型是在候选人有政策偏好和对获胜本身的兴趣的假设下发展起来的。当有两个候选人时，该模型在k-issue空间中具有均衡。这个模型的含义与唐斯式模型的含义进行了比较，在唐斯式模型中，候选人只对获胜感兴趣。可检验的命题是通过使用比较静力学推导出来的。最近的研究结果与综合模型一致，但与纯粹的唐斯模型不一致。理论模型弥合了形式理论与实证研究之间的鸿沟，统一了各种看似不相关的研究。
A formal model of electoral behavior is developed under the assumption that candidates have policy preferences as well as an interest in winning per se. This model is shown to have an equilibrium in a k-issue space when there are two candidates. The implications of this model are compared to the implications of the Downsian-type model where candidates are interested only in winning. Testable propositions are derived via the use of comparative statics. The results of recent studies are shown to coincide with the synthesis model but not the pure Downsian model. The theoretical model bridges the gap between formal theory and empirical research and unifies a variety of seemingly unrelated studies.