Decision and Game Theory for Security - 13th International Conference, GameSec 2022, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, October 26-28, 2022, Proceedings
Decision and Game Theory for Security - 13th International Conference, GameSec 2022, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, October 26-28, 2022, Proceedings
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安全决策与博弈论 - 第 13 届国际会议，GameSec 2022，美国宾夕法尼亚州匹兹堡，2022 年 10 月 26-28 日，会议记录
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-031-26369-9_15
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发表时间：
2023
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Bhattacherjee S
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Bhattacherjee S
我们使用投票游戏对工作量证明加密货币的协议稳定性和安全性进行建模。第一个游戏，我们称之为规则游戏，涉及加密货币矿工参与投票程序以接受或拒绝加密货币协议变更提案的场景。第二个游戏，我们称之为攻击游戏，指的是一组矿工可以组成联盟来启动 \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} 的场景\setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$51\%$$\end{document} 对系统进行攻击，从而改变底层区块链的部分历史，从而违背其不变性的承诺。对于攻击博弈，我们定义了逐步细化的安全概念，所有这些概念都基于投票博弈理论中最小获胜联盟的关键概念。对于规则游戏和攻击游戏，我们使用比特币现实世界数据的快照展示了投票博弈论工具的实际适用性。特别是，这凸显了比特币安全性相对于 \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} 的脆弱性\begin{document}$$51\%$$\end{document} 攻击。
We model theprotocol stabilityand thesecurityof proof-of-work cryptocurrencies using voting games. The first game, which we call the Rule Game, pertains to the scenario where the cryptocurrency miners engage in a voting procedure to accept or reject a proposal for change of the cryptocurrency protocol. The second game, which we call the Attack Game, refers to the scenario where a group of miners can form a coalition to launch a \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$51\%$$\end{document} attack on the system and consequently change a portion of the history of the underlying blockchain, thus defeating its promise of immutability. For the Attack Game, we define progressively granular notions of security all of which are based on the key concept of minimal winning coalitions from voting game theory. For both the Rule Game and the Attack Game, we show practical applicability of tools from voting game theory using a snapshot of real world data for Bitcoin. In particular, this highlights the fragile nature of the security of Bitcoin with respect to \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$51\%$$\end{document} attacks.