Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems
Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems
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在替代选举制度下培养受青睐的少数群体的激励措施
DOI：
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发表时间：
1993
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
R. Myerson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Myerson
使用一个简单的模型来比较不同选举制度下候选人通过做出有利于小群体而不是平等地吸引所有选民的竞选承诺，在其他同质选民中制造不平等的动机。在此博弈模型中，每个候选人根据候选人选择的分布独立地为选民生成报价，仅受报价必须为非负且均值为 1 的约束。在排名评分规则、批准投票和单次可转让投票下，分析了两名候选人选举和多候选人选举的真诚投票的对称均衡。在这种模式下，可以保证少数派在多席位选举中的代表权的投票规则会产生最严重不平等的竞选承诺。
A simple model is used to compare, under different electoral systems, the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters, by making campaign promises that favor small groups, rather than appealing equally to all voters. In this game model, each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate, subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1. Symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two-candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank-scoring rules, approval voting, and single transferable vote. Voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate, in this model, the most severely unequal campaign promises.