Network reactions to banking regulations
Network reactions to banking regulations
复制标题
网络对银行法规的反应
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2017.03.005
复制
发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Guillermo Ordoñez
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Selman Erol;Guillermo Ordoñez
最优的监管限制必须解决银行的微妙平衡。更严格的监管降低了银行陷入困境的可能性。宽松的监管有利于将资金分配给生产性投资。对于多家银行，最优监管变得更具挑战性。银行在银行同业拆借市场上结成伙伴关系，以满足流动性需求和投资可能性。我们发现，当监管被推到临界水平以上时，银行间网络可能突然崩溃，随着银行交叉保险的崩溃，系统性风险会不连续地增加。
Optimal regulatory restrictions on banks have to solve a delicate balance. Tighter regulations reduce the likelihood of banks’ distress. Looser regulations foster the allocation of funds toward productive investments. With multiple banks, optimal regulation becomes even more challenging. Banks form partnerships in the interbank lending market in order to face liquidity needs and to meet investment possibilities. We show that the interbank network can suddenly collapse when regulations are pushed beyond a critical level, with a discontinuous increase in systemic risk as the cross-insurance of banks collapses.