Institutionalizing the public interest: The defense of deadlock and beyond
Institutionalizing the public interest: The defense of deadlock and beyond
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DOI：
10.2307/2082888
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发表时间：
1996-06-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Goodin, RE
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Goodin, RE
许多人哀叹分裂的政府和随之而来的民主僵局。《联邦党人》的逻辑可以说是以迄今为止未被欣赏的方式为它辩护，它诉诸于“公共利益”的最小公分母定义。这种准联邦主义者的逻辑被探讨，替代的政治结构被评估，对公共利益的标准，它呼吁。另一个更合理的公共利益概念被引入，其非常不同的政治风格，机构和政策被引证。
Many bemoan divided government and the consequent deadlock of democracy. The logic of The Federalist arguably defends it, in ways heretofore unappreciated, by appeal to a least-common-denominator definition of the ''public interest.'' That quasi-Federalist logic is explored, and alternative political structures are assessed against the public interest criterion to which it appeals. Another and more defensible notion of the public interest is introduced, and its very different political styles, institutions, and policies are adduced.