Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International Governance
Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International Governance
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硬法与软法：国际治理中的替代、补充和对抗
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Mark A. Pollack
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Shaffer;Mark A. Pollack
本文论述了在一个支离破碎的国际法体系中硬法和软法的相互作用。这个问题在当今世界日益重要，因为在这个世界上，各种有效的国际制度在处理全球化和国家相互依存问题时，没有任何支配性的法律的等级制度。这篇文章提出了三个核心主张，与现有文献形成对比。第一个也是最主要的主张是，国际硬法律文书和软法律文书在许多情况下不仅可以作为替代或补充，而且也可以作为对抗。第二个相关主张是，这种互动对支离破碎的国际法体系具有特殊影响，影响到国际硬法和软法制度的本质及其所谓的优势。硬法律制度和软法律制度的相互作用可能导致软法律制度更加强硬，导致更多的战略性讨价还价，并减少其通过信息共享和说服建立共识的所谓优势;它可能导致硬法律制度软化，导致法律的确定性和可预测性降低，特别是在强国之间存在分配冲突的情况下。第三个也是最后一个主张是，硬法和软法的相互作用不是一个二元的非此即彼的问题，而是一个具体说明我们可以期望行为者在何种条件下将硬法和软法作为替代、补充或对抗来使用的问题。现有的文献集中讨论如何利用硬性法律和软性法律作为补充并没有错，但这些文献只讲述了部分情况。本文提供了一个总体的理论框架，以理解国家和其他行为者选择以不同方式使用硬法和软法的条件，强调国家及其选民之间分配冲突的重要性，以及政权复合体的兴起，作为有利于使用硬法和软法作为对抗者的条件。
This article addresses the interaction of hard and soft law in a fragmented international law system. This issue is increasingly important in a world where functional international regimes proliferate to address globalization and national interdependence without any overarching legal hierarchy. The article makes three core claims in contradistinction to the existing literature. The first and primary claim is that international hard and soft law instruments can serve not only as alternatives or complements, but also as antagonists in many situations. The second, related claim is that this interaction has particular implications in a fragmented international law system, affecting the very nature of international hard and soft law regimes and their purported advantages. The interaction of hard and soft law regimes can lead to the hardening of soft law regimes, resulting in more strategic bargaining and reducing their purported advantages of consensus-building through information-sharing and persuasion; and it can lead to the softening of hard law regimes, resulting in reduced legal certainty and predictability, especially where there is distributive conflict between powerful states. The third and final claim is that the interaction of hard and soft law is not a binary either/or question, but one of specifying the conditions under which we can expect actors to employ hard and soft law as alternatives, complements or antagonists. The existing literature is not wrong in focusing on how hard and soft law may be employed as complements, but this literature tells only part of the story. The article provides an overarching theoretical framework for understanding the conditions under which states and other actors choose to employ hard and soft law in different ways, emphasizing the importance of distributive conflict among countries and their constituencies and the rise of regime complexes as conditions favorable to the use of hard and soft law as antagonists.