Ockham’S Reliabilism And The Intuition Of Non-Existents
Ockham’S Reliabilism And The Intuition Of Non-Existents
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奥卡姆的可靠性论和不存在的直觉
DOI:
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发表时间:
2009
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
David Piché
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
C. Panaccio;David Piché
Ockhams stance toward skepticism has been variously assessed throughout the last hundred years of medieval scholarship, and much of the fuss, as it turns out, revolved around his controversial thesis about the intuition of non-existent beings. This chapter first recalls the main components of Ockhams relevant doctrine, and then successively considers what theological and philosophical reasons he may have had for them. The main conclusion is that although he did have theological reasons to some extent, the most distinctive features of Ockhams thought on the matter are based on a properly philosophical attitude with respect to knowledge, which can legitimately be labelled, in contemporary terms, as a strong form of reliabilism . Keywords: intuition of non-existents; Ockham; philosophical attitude; reliabilism; theological reasons