Delegation and Incentives
Delegation and Incentives
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00033.x
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发表时间：
2007-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Bester;Daniel Krahmer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Bester;Daniel Krahmer
本文分析了权威与激励之间的关系。它通过项目选择阶段扩展了标准的委托-代理模型，委托人可以将项目的选择委托给代理人，也可以保留权力。代理人随后的努力选择取决于金钱激励和所选项目。我们发现，考虑努力激励使得委托人不太可能将项目的权力委托给代理人。事实上，如果代理人受到有限责任的保护，授权永远不是最佳选择。
This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal--agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal.