Semantic values in higher-order semantics
Semantic values in higher-order semantics
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高阶语义中的语义值
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发表时间：
2014
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通讯作者：
Stephan Krämer
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作者：
Stephan Krämer
最近，一些哲学家认为，我们应该把任何（有限）阶的量化看作是一种合法的、不可约的、自成一类的量化。特别是，他们认为高阶量化的语义理论本身必须用高阶术语表达。林奈波批评了这些观点，理由是他们致力于关于表达的语义价值的一般主张，而这些语义价值本身是不可表达的。我表明，Linnebo的反对依赖于一个概念的语义值或贡献，既适用于任何顺序的表达式的假设，并挑选出，为每个表达式，一个额外的语言相关的表达。我继续论证，高阶语言学家可以合理地拒绝这一假设，他们可以用一个概念层次来描述不同阶表达的超语言关联。
Recently, some philosophers have argued that we should take quantification of any (finite) order to be a legitimate and irreducible, sui generis kind of quantification. In particular, they hold that a semantic theory for higher-order quantification must itself be couched in higher-order terms. Øystein Linnebo has criticized such views on the grounds that they are committed to general claims about the semantic values of expressions that are by their own lights inexpressible. I show that Linnebo’s objection rests on the assumption of a notion of semantic value or contribution which both applies to expressions of any order, and picks out, for each expression, an extra-linguistic correlate of that expression. I go on to argue that higher-orderists can plausibly reject this assumption, by means of a hierarchy of notions they can use to describe the extra-lingustic correlates of expressions of different orders.