Transaction Costs, Asymmetric Countries and Flexible Trade Agreements
Transaction Costs, Asymmetric Countries and Flexible Trade Agreements
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交易成本、不对称国家和灵活的贸易协定
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Eric W. Bond
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mostafa Beshkar;Eric W. Bond
我们研究的最优设计的贸易协定时，一个国家或有协议的实施涉及到核实世界的普遍状态的成本。在代价高昂的国家核查下，最优贸易协定的形式是带有免责条款的taricap。我们还研究了国家不对称性的作用，并表明，在最佳协议下，较大的国家更有可能受到taricap的约束，并使用免责条款。另一方面，较小的国家往往有较大的关税悬置.这些预测与我们的经验观察是一致的，即WTO成员国经常适用低于其约束的关税税率，并且适用关税约束的可能性与国家大小呈正相关。
We study optimal design of trade agreements when the implementation of a state-contingent agreement involves the cost of verifying the prevailing state of the world. Under costly state-veri…cation the optimal trade agree- ment has the form of a taricap with an escape clause. We also study the role of country asymmetry and show that under an optimal agreement larger countries are more likely to be bound by the taricap and to use the escape clause. Smaller countries, on the other hand, tend to have larger tariover- hang. These predictions are consistent with our empirical observation that the WTO members frequently apply taris that are below their bindings, and that the likelihood of applying tariat the binding is positively correlated with the country size.