Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector
Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector
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DOI：
10.1007/s12398-012-0084-2
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发表时间：
2012-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Cramton;Axel Ockenfels
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Cramton;Axel Ockenfels
产能市场是确保资源充足的一种手段。对产能市场的需求源于几个市场失灵，其中最突出的是缺乏强劲的需求侧。有限的需求反应使得稀缺时期的市场出清成问题。我们提出了容量市场的经济动机，提出了一个具体的市场设计，利用了文献中分析的各种资源充足性方法的最佳设计特征，并讨论了处理这些问题的其他工具。然后，我们讨论了欧洲，特别是德国市场的适用性。
Capacity markets are a means to assure resource adequacy. The need for a capacity market stems from several market failures the most prominent of which is the absence of a robust demand-side. Limited demand response makes market clearing problematic in times of scarcity. We present the economic motivation for a capacity market, present one specific market design that utilizes the best design features from various resource adequacy approaches analyzed in the literature, and we discuss other instruments to deal with the problems. We then discuss the suitability of the market for Europe and Germany in particular.