Social Security, the Supply of Labor, and Capital Accumulation
Social Security, the Supply of Labor, and Capital Accumulation
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社会保障、劳动力供给和资本积累
DOI：
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发表时间：
1979
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Sheng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sheng
社会保障制度在美国家庭的经济生活中发挥着重要作用。它不仅为老年人提供保障，而且是一种自动稳定的手段，一种收入再分配的方法，也是影响资本积累和劳动力供给的重要因素。本文的目的是分析社会保障制度在经济增长中的长期效应。本文所用的模型是对彼得·A. Diamond和Paul A.萨缪尔森明确允许内生退休决策和遗赠动机。我考虑一个人口以恒定速度增长的经济。每个人都有两个阶段。在第一阶段，他全职工作，收入为w，缴纳社会保障税为T。在第二个时期，他工作一小部分时间，然后退休，从政府领取z的养老金。他要选择一条消费道路、一个退休年龄和一笔遗赠，以使他的终身效用最大化。从这些个人决定和政府预算在每个时期都是平衡的假设出发，我们推导出总资本和劳动力供给函数，并分析了社会保障的变化对资本积累和均衡工资和利率的影响。本模型与Martin S.费尔德斯坦认为，退休决定是内生的。主要的区别是，他是一个局部均衡分析，而这里提出的模型是一个一般均衡模型，能够分析长期的影响。我表明，社会保障的短期效应主要取决于劳动力需求和供给的弹性，其长期效应也受到储蓄和遗赠弹性的影响。进一步表明，适当的社会保障制度可以通过使资本回报率收敛到黄金法则水平来增加经济的长期福祉。然而，如果税收和养老金水平与个人的工作退休决定挂钩，则该系统会导致劳动力市场的扭曲。由于这种扭曲效应，最优社会保障并不一定导致黄金法则。
The Social Security system has played an important role in the economic life of American families. It not only provides security for the elderly, but is a device for automatic stabilization, a method of income redistribution, as well as an important factor affecting capital accumulation and the supply of labor. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the long-run effects of the Social Security system in a growing economy. The model employed here extends and generalizes the neoclassical life cycle growth models of Peter A. Diamond and Paul A. Samuelson by explicitly allowing for an endogenous retirement decision and bequest motive. I consider an economy in which the population grows at a constant rate. Each individual lives for two periods. In the first period, he works full time, earning an income of w and paying a Social Security tax of T. In the second period, he works a fraction of time and then retires, receiving from the government a pension of z. He is to choose a consumption path, a retirement age, and an amount of bequest so as to maximize his lifetime utility. From these individual decisions and the assumption that the government budget is balanced each period, we derive the aggregate capital and labor supply functions and analyze the effects of changes in Social Security on capital accumulation and the equilibrium wage and interest rates. The present model is similar to that of Martin S. Feldstein in that retirement decisions are assumed endogenous. The main difference is that his is a partial equilibrium analysis while the model presented here is a general equilibrium model capable of analyzing long-run effects. I show that the short-run effects of Social Security depend primarily on the elasticities of the demand and supply of labor, and its long-run effects are influenced as well by the elasticities of savings and bequest. It is further shown that an appropriate Social Security system can increase the long-run well-being of the economy by causing the rate of return on capital to converge to the Golden Rule level. If, however, the tax and pension levels are tied to the individual workingretirement decisions, the system causes distortions in the labor market. Because of this distortional effect, the optimal Social Security does not necessarily lead to the Golden Rule.