Bid-Rigging and the Threat of Government Prosecution
Bid-Rigging and the Threat of Government Prosecution
复制标题
串通投标和政府起诉的威胁
DOI：
10.2307/2555995
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. LaCasse
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. LaCasse
在本文中，我开发了一个简单的投标模型，其中共谋是内生的。考虑到面临政府起诉的威胁，在首价密封拍卖中，买家决定是否操纵自己的出价。法律当局根据投标决定是否调查买方。在这个博弈的独特的顺序均衡中，买者以正概率操纵他们的出价，但法律权威永远不能仅仅根据出价确定一个阴谋已经形成。
In this article, I develop a simple bidding model in which collusion is endogenous. Buyers at a first-price sealed-bid auction decide whether to rig their bids given that they face the threat of government prosecution. A legal authority chooses whether to investigate the buyers on the basis of the bids tendered. In the unique sequential equilibrium of the game, buyers rig their bids with positive probability, but the legal authority can never ascertain, on the basis of the bids alone, that a conspiracy has formed.