Not just babble : Opening the black box of communication in avoluntary contribution experiment
Not just babble : Opening the black box of communication in avoluntary contribution experiment
复制标题
不只是胡言乱语：在自愿贡献实验中打开沟通的黑匣子
DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.09.005
复制
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
L. Putterman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Olivier Bochet;L. Putterman
我们让志愿捐款实验中的受试者就他们“可能的”捐款做出不具约束力的数字声明，并在某些治疗中发送书面承诺，以提供特定的金额。我们发现，公告的反应，其他人的公告和真实的发挥，例如公告导致昂贵的惩罚时，发现是误导。我们还发现，在惩罚治疗中加入赛前通知可以通过让免费的警告代替昂贵的惩罚来提高效率。惩罚虚假公告和承诺的威胁有助于减少虚假信号，但只有当可以发送承诺声明时，效果才足以实现更高的效率。
We let subjects in a voluntary contribution experiment make non-binding numerical announcements about their “possible” contributions and, in some treatments, send written promises to contribute specific amounts. We find that announcements were responded to both by others’ announcements and by real play, for example announcements led to costly punishment when found to be misleading. We also find that adding pre-play announcements to treatments with punishment can increase efficiency by letting cost-free warnings substitute for costly punishment. The threat of punishing false announcements and promises helps reduce false signals, but only when promise statements can be sent is the effect sufficient for achieving greater efficiency.