Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace
Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace
复制标题
权力共享、保护与和平
作者：
S. Gates;Benjamin A. T. Graham;Y. Lupu;Håvard Strand;Kaare W. Strøm
权力分享通常被认为会导致国内和平，尽管其效果存在争议。我们确定了三种类型的权力共享-包容，分散和约束-并分析其权力分配的机制。我们认为，约束性安排，限制一个政党或社会团体的权力，最有可能保护弱势群体。限制权力分享机构，如保障公民自由和保护公民自由的独立司法机构，可以遏制政府对少数群体和普通公民的镇压，而其他类型的权力分享则侧重于政治精英。限制权力分享体制限制了大规模动员的动力，提高了冲突的成本，从而降低了内战的可能性。利用一个新的全球数据集，我们研究了权力分享对内战爆发和复发的影响。与之前的研究结果相反，我们的研究结果表明，只有限制权力分享机构有和平的效果。
Power sharing is often purported to lead to civil peace, though its effects are disputed. We identify three types of power sharing—inclusive, dispersive, and constraining—and analyze their mechanisms of power allocation. We argue that constraining arrangements, which limit the power of a party or social group, are most likely to protect vulnerable groups. Constraining power-sharing institutions, such as guarantees of civil liberties and independent judiciaries to protect them, create checks against governmental repression of minority groups and ordinary citizens, whereas other types of power sharing focus on political elites. Constraining power-sharing institutions limit incentives for mass mobilization and raise the costs of conflict, thus reducing the probability of civil war. Drawing on a new global data set, we examine the effects of power sharing on the onset and recurrence of civil war. In contrast to prior findings, our results show that only constraining power-sharing institutions have a pacific effect.