Dynamic Merger Review
Dynamic Merger Review
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DOI：
10.1086/658161
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发表时间：
2008-12
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Volker Nocke;M. Whinston
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Volker Nocke;M. Whinston
我们分析了最优动态政策的反垄断机构对横向合并合并时，合并建议是内生的，并随着时间的推移发生。批准目前提议的合并可能会影响未来潜在合并的盈利能力和福利效应，其特点可能尚不清楚。我们确定的条件下，贴现预期消费者剩余最大化，通过使用一个完全短视的合并审查政策，批准合并，当且仅当它不降低消费者剩余，鉴于目前的市场结构。我们还讨论了一些扩展，以及破坏短视的合并审查政策的最优性的因素。
We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority toward horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger may affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, whose characteristics may not yet be known. We identify conditions under which discounted expected consumer surplus is maximized by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure. We also discuss a number of extensions as well as factors that undermine the optimality of myopic merger review policies.