CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data
CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-036x.2009.00511.x
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发表时间：
2007-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Neslihan Ozkan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Neslihan Ozkan
本文研究了CEO薪酬和绩效之间的联系，采用了独特的，手工收集的面板数据集的390家英国非金融公司从富时全股指数为1999年至2005年。我们包括现金（工资和奖金）和股权（股票期权和长期激励计划）的CEO薪酬组成部分的一个小组的大型英国公司。与以往研究不同的是，本文采用了GMM系统估计方法，控制了未观察到的企业效应的存在和解释变量的内隐性。此外，我们还控制着一套全面的公司治理变量。实证结果表明，CEO现金薪酬水平与公司绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系，而总薪酬水平与公司绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系，但不显著。这一发现表明，在英国的公司治理报告，如格林伯里报告（1995年），建议首席执行官的薪酬更密切地与业绩挂钩，并没有完全有效。我们还发现，董事会中的非执行董事的比例并没有对CEO的现金薪酬有显著的影响，而非执行董事的股权有显著的影响，这表明所有权可以提供激励，非执行董事更积极地监督CEO的薪酬方案。我们的研究结果还表明，机构所有权有一个积极的和显着的影响CEO薪酬与绩效的敏感性期权赠款。最后，我们发现，首席执行官任期越长，期权赠款的绩效薪酬敏感性越低，这表明首席执行官任期的巩固效应。
This paper examines the link between CEO pay and performance employing a unique, hand-collected panel data set of 390 UK non-financial firms from the FTSE All Share Index for the period 1999-2005. We include both cash (salary and bonus) and equity-based (stock options and long-term incentive plans) components of CEO compensation for a panel of large UK companies. Different from previous studies, we use GMM-system estimation method, which controls for the presence of unobserved firm-specific effects and for the endogeneity of explanatory variables. In addition, we control for a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables. The empirical results indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between firm performance and the level of CEO cash compensation while the relationship is positive but not significant for total compensation. This finding suggests that corporate governance reports in the UK, such as Greenbury Report (1995) that proposed CEO compensation be more closely linked to performance, have not been totally effective. We also find that proportion of non-executive directors on board does not have a significant impact on CEO cash compensation, while non-executive directors' share ownership has a significant impact suggesting that ownership can provide incentives for non-executive directors to be more active in monitoring for CEO compensation packages. Our results also indicate that institutional ownership has a positive and significant influence on CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity of option grants. Finally, we find that longer CEO tenure is associated with lower pay-for-performance sensitivity of option grants suggesting the entrenchment effect of CEO tenure.