The Relevance of Logic to Reasoning and Beleif Revision: Harman on ‘Change in View’
The Relevance of Logic to Reasoning and Beleif Revision: Harman on ‘Change in View’
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逻辑与推理和信仰修正的相关性：哈曼谈“观点的改变”
DOI：
10.1111/1468-0114.00029
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发表时间：
1997
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
W. Knorpp
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Knorpp
关于Change of View：吉尔伯特·哈曼在《推理原理》一书中认为：（1）所有真正的推理都是信念修正的问题，而且，由于（2）逻辑与信念修正并不“特别相关”，（3）逻辑也与推理并不特别相关。因此，哈曼认为，我们需要的是一种“推理理论”--顺便说一句，它将是心理学的，告诉我们如何去做，以及我们应该如何去推理。我认为，哈曼未能建立这样一个理论的需要，因为（a）推理并不总是一个信念修正的问题，（B）逻辑是，事实上，最相关的推理和信念修正。
In Change of View: Principles of Reasoning, Gilbert Harman argues that (i) all genuine reasoning is a matter of belief revision, and that, since (ii) logic is not “specially relevant” to belief revision, (iii) logic is not specially relevant to reasoning, either. Thus, Harman suggests, what is needed is a “theory of reasoning”–which, incidentally, will be psychologistic, telling us both how we do and how we should reason. I argue that Harman fails to establish the need for such a theory, because (a) reasoning is not always a matter of belief revision, and (b) logic is, in fact, of the utmost relevance to both reasoning and belief revision.