Non-symmetric Cardinal Value Allocations

Non-symmetric Cardinal Value Allocations
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非对称基数价值分配

DOI:
10.2307/1913510
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发表时间:
1984
期刊:
影响因子:
6.1
通讯作者:
N. Yannelis
N. Yannelis
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
A. Scafuri;N. Yannelis

文献摘要

被引文献

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结果表明,基数分配可能不是对称的。具体地说,具有相同偏好和相同天赋的代理人在基本价值分配上可以得到非常不同的对待。这进一步令人怀疑将权重解释为“内生效用比较”。
It is shown that cardinal value allocations may fail to be symmetric. Specifically, agents with identical preferences and identical endowments can be treated very differently at a cardinal value allocation. This casts further doubt on the interpretation of the weights as "endogenous utility comparisons."