No‐Betting‐Pareto Dominance
No‐Betting‐Pareto Dominance
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不下注帕累托支配
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Schmeidler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
I. Gilboa;L. Samuelson;D. Schmeidler
我们认为，帕累托支配的概念在不确定的情况下不如在确定的情况下令人信服。特别是，基于品味差异的自愿交易通常被认为是可取的，因为品味不可能是错的。相比之下，基于不相容信念的自愿交易可能表明，至少有一个代理人持有错误信念。我们提出并描述了一个较弱的，无赌注的帕累托支配的概念，它要求，在一致的偏好之上，存在共同的信念，可以使每个代理的这种偏好合理化。
We argue that the notion of Pareto dominance is not as compelling in the presence of uncertainty as it is under certainty. In particular, voluntary trade based on differences in tastes is commonly accepted as desirable, because tastes cannot be wrong. By contrast, voluntary trade based on incompatible beliefs may indicate that at least one agent entertains mistaken beliefs. We propose and characterize a weaker, No-Betting, notion of Pareto domination which requires, on top of unanimity of preference, the existence of shared beliefs that can rationalize such preference for each agent.