Evasive Ability and the Efficiency Cost of the Underground Economy
Evasive Ability and the Efficiency Cost of the Underground Economy
复制标题
地下经济的规避能力与效率成本
DOI：
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Filip Palda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Filip Palda
在存在不同的逃税能力的情况下，市场会根据生产商的逃税技能和保持低生产成本的能力来选择生产商。低效企业排挤高效企业。如果效率最低的企业是最好的逃税者，逆向选择是严重的，产出完全来自供给曲线的高成本一端。如果逃税能力允许政府扮演价格歧视垄断者的角色，逃税情况下的税收收入可能比没有逃税情况下的税收收入更高。当回避型人才和生产性人才不相关时，这个结果就消失了，但由于企业逆向选择造成的无谓损失仍然存在，并且与传统三角无谓损失的规模相当。
In the presence of differing abilities to evade taxes, markets select producers for their evasive skills and their abilities to keep costs of production low. Inefficient firms crowd out efficient firms. If the least efficient firms are the best tax evaders, adverse selection is severe and output comes entirely from the high cost end of the supply curve. Tax revenue may be greater under tax evasion than without evasion if evasive ability allows government to act as a price-discriminating monopolist. When evasive and productive talents are unrelated this result disappears, but the deadweight loss due to adverse selection of firms persists and rivals the size of the traditional triangle deadweight loss.