Moral Status and the Direction of Duties*
Moral Status and the Direction of Duties*
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道德地位和职责方向*
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. May
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. May
Gopal Sreenivasan的“混合理论”指出，道德责任是针对个人的，因为她的利益证明了对责任的控制权的分配。另一种“简单理论”认为，个人的利益证明义务本身是正当的。我认为，一个强大的道德地位约束解释了Sreenivasan的工具化反对一个Razian平原理论，但他自己的模型违反了这一约束。我建议如何这两种方法可以重新制定，以满足约束，我认为，一个重新制定的平原理论也可以避免不足的异议。因此，混合方法与普通方法相比没有明显的优势。
Gopal Sreenivasan’s “hybrid theory” states that a moral duty is directed toward an individual because her interests justify the assignment of control over the duty. An alternative “plain theory” states that the individual’s interests justify the duty itself. I argue that a strong moral status constraint explains Sreenivasan’s instrumentalization objection to a Razian plain theory but that his own model violates this constraint. I suggest how both approaches can be reformulated to satisfy the constraint, and I argue that a reformulated plain theory can also avoid an insufficiency objection. The hybrid approach consequently has no clear advantage over the plain approach.