Extended emotions
Extended emotions
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DOI：
10.1111/phc3.12390
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发表时间：
2016-12-01
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Szanto, Thomas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Krueger, Joel;Szanto, Thomas
直到最近，哲学家和心理学家还将情绪视为与大脑和身体有关的事情。但研究人员已经开始挑战这种内在论和个人主义的正统观念。一项快速增长的研究表明，一些情绪吸收了外部资源，因此超出了生物体的神经生理范围；一些人甚至认为，情绪可以在社会上延伸，并由多个代理人共享。这就是《情绪延伸论题》(Extended Emotions Team，EXE)。在这篇文章中，我们考虑了哲学、心理学和认知科学对EXE的不同理解方式。首先，我们概述了这场辩论的背景，并讨论了不同的论证策略。特别是，我们将EXE与同源但更温和的关于认知和情绪的具体化和情境性的主张区分开来(第1节)。然后我们详述了EXE的两个维度：由物质文化延伸的情感和由社会因素延伸的情感(第二节)。最后，我们针对一些反对意见为EXE辩护(第3节)，并指出未来研究的理想之处(第4节)。
Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain- and body-bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended emotions thesis (ExE). In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy, psychology, and the cognitive sciences. First, we outline the background of the debate and discuss different argumentative strategies for ExE. In particular, we distinguish ExE from cognate but more moderate claims about the embodied and situated nature of cognition and emotion (Section1). We then dwell upon two dimensions of ExE: emotions extended by material culture and by the social factors (Section2). We conclude by defending ExE against some objections (Section3) and point to desiderata for future research (Section4).