The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits in Africa
The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits in Africa
复制标题
重新审视权力制度化：非洲总统任期限制
DOI：
10.1177/000203971705200204
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Claudia Simons
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Tull;Claudia Simons
在非洲，似乎越来越多的总统试图克服或废除任期限制，或使其无效，引发了关于宪政工程的重要性及其对法治，民主和政治本质的影响的辩论。鉴于最近的“第三次竞选”，我们重新审视了关于非洲权力制度化的假设，并对过去二十年来非洲政治经历了从“大人物”统治向法治的根本转变的假设提出了挑战。基于对任期限制和第三任期投标的全面评估，我们分析了法律的和宪法工程的更广泛趋势和结果。我们认为，分析完全集中在正式的机构和程序歪曲了政治变革的程度，忽视了权力和权威，在许多非洲国家。虽然正式制度的日益突出是不可否认的，但我们认为，它们更重要的是作为政治领导人权力的合法化，而不是作为对它的约束。
In Africa, a seemingly growing number of attempts by presidents to overcome or abrogate term limits, or make them otherwise ineffective, has ignited a debate about the significance of constitutional engineering, and its implications for the rule of law, democracy, and the nature of politics in general. In light of recent instances of “third-term bids,” we revisit the hypothesis about the institutionalisation of power in Africa and challenge the assumption that, over the past two decades, African politics have experienced a fundamental change away from “big man” rule towards the rule of law. Based on a comprehensive stocktaking of the state of play of term limits and third-term bids, we analyse broader trends and outcomes of legal and constitutional engineering. We argue that an analysis focusing exclusively on formal institutions and procedures misrepresents the extent of political change by ignoring power and authority in many African countries. While the growing salience of formal institutions is undeniable, we suggest that they matter more as a legitimisation of the power of political leaders than as a constraint to it.