Signal residuals during shell fighting in hermit crabs: can costly signals be used deceptively?
Signal residuals during shell fighting in hermit crabs: can costly signals be used deceptively?
复制标题
DOI：
10.1093/beheco/arj059
复制
发表时间：
2006-05-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Briffa, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Briffa, M
动物在一系列情况下，包括在获得资源的竞争性竞赛中，都会展示个体素质的各个方面。广告可以通过不同类型的信号产生，这些信号可以大致分为“常规信号”和“昂贵信号”。“在这两种情况下，信号被认为是诚实的，因此作弊的任何好处都非常有限，因为宣传不准确的高质量水平的成本太高。然而，有些人可能会从系统中的低水平作弊中受益，否则是诚实的。在这里，我测试这种可能性，一个昂贵的信号，通过分析残差之间的关系的一个关键参数的信号幅度和两个措施的战斗能力，从“壳打架”寄居蟹。相反的预期，大量使用虚张声势，个人表现在一个更大的幅度比预期的能力更有可能赢得比赛，但使用较少的重复比那些表现低于预期的水平，他们的能力。这表明性能水平主要由成本驱动，并且在这种情况下，信号残差的功能意义在于它们提供了关于战斗能力的几种测量的信息。
Animals advertise aspects of individual quality in a range of situations including during agonistic contests over access to resources. The advertisement can be produced by different types of signal, which can be broadly classified into "conventional signals" and "costly signals." In both cases, the signals are thought to be honest such that any benefits to cheating are very limited due to prohibitive costs of advertising an inaccurately high level of quality. However, some individuals may benefit by low-level cheating in systems that are otherwise honest. Here, I test this possibility for a costly signal by analyzing residuals from relationships between a key parameter of signal magnitude and two measures of fighting ability from "shell fights" in hermit crabs. Contrary to the expectations for significant use of bluffing, individuals that performed at a greater magnitude than expected for their ability were more likely to win the encounter but used fewer repetitions than those that performed below the level expected for their ability. This indicates that the level of performance is primarily driven by the cost and that the functional significance of signal residuals in this case is that they provide information on several measures of fighting ability.