Political Affiliation and Dividend Tax Avoidance: Evidence from the 2013 Fiscal Cliff
Political Affiliation and Dividend Tax Avoidance: Evidence from the 2013 Fiscal Cliff
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政治立场与股息避税：来自 2013 年财政悬崖的证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2407997
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Theo Vermaelen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
U. Peyer;Theo Vermaelen
本文使用 2013 年财政悬崖作为自然实验，研究首席执行官的政治背景如何影响公司对个人股息税预期增加的反应。企业可以通过在2012年最后两个月支付额外股息和加速支付股息来避免此类额外税收。将这些避税者与2013年前3个月至2012年11月或12月期间没有加速支付第一季度股息的公司样本（故意纳税人）进行比较。在其他条件不变的情况下，共和党首席执行官更有可能帮助投资者节省个人所得税。然而，除了先前记录的影响（Hanlon 和 Hoopes，2014）之外，政治派别还具有解释力，例如对首席执行官个人财富的影响以及内部持股比例。对“为富人避税”的声誉担忧以及公司治理质量也是企业行为的重要决定因素。
This paper uses the 2013 fiscal cliff as a natural experiment to examine how the political affiliation of the CEO affects a firm's response to an expected increase in personal taxes on dividends. Firms could avoid such additional taxes by paying extra dividends and accelerating dividends in the last 2months of 2012. These tax avoiders are compared with a sample of firms that did not accelerate the payment of their first quarterly dividend from the first 3months of 2013 to November or December 2012 (the deliberate taxpayers). Ceteris paribus, Republican CEOs are more likely to help their investors to save money on personal income taxes. However, the political affiliation has explanatory power in addition to previously documented effects (Hanlon and Hoopes, 2014), such as the consequences for the CEO's personal wealth as well as the percentage of insider holdings. Reputational concerns about “avoiding taxes for the rich” as well as corporate governance quality are also significant determinants of corporate behavior.