Price Transparency For Medical Devices
Price Transparency For Medical Devices
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DOI：
10.1377/hlthaff.27.6.1544
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发表时间：
2008-11-01
期刊：
影响因子：
9.7
通讯作者：
Burns, Lawton R.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Pauly, Mark V.;Burns, Lawton R.
医疗设备的医院买家与销售差异化产品的具有市场力量的制造商签订合同。医务人员对医院设备的选择有很大的影响。卖家一直试图限制交易价格的披露。为了提高透明度，政策制定者提出了强制披露信息的立法。我们讨论了为什么一家制造商可能向不同的医院收取不同的价格，保密所起的作用，以及保密与披露的后果。我们认为，医院和医生的关系是理解制造商从价格歧视中获得什么的关键。价格披露可以促进这些关系的重组，这反过来又可以改善医院的讨价还价。[卫生事务27，第6期(2008年)：1544-1553；10.1377/hlthaff.27.6.1544]
Hospital buyers of medical devices contract with manufacturers with market power that sell differentiated products. The medical staff strongly influences hospitals' choice of devices. Sellers have sought to limit disclosure of transaction prices. Policy-makers have proposed legislation mandating disclosure, in the interest of greater transparency. We discuss why a manufacturer might charge different prices to different hospitals, the role that secrecy plays, and the consequences of secrecy versus disclosure. We argue that hospital-physician relationships are key to understanding what manufacturers gain from price discrimination. Price disclosure can catalyze a restructuring of those relationships, which, in turn, can improve hospital bargaining. [Health Affairs 27, no. 6 (2008): 1544-1553; 10.1377/hlthaff.27.6.1544]