A layout-driven framework to assess vulnerability of ICs to microprobing attacks
A layout-driven framework to assess vulnerability of ICs to microprobing attacks
复制标题
一种布局驱动框架，用于评估 IC 对微探测攻击的脆弱性
DOI：
10.1109/hst.2016.7495575
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Tehranipoor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Qihang Shi;Navid Asadizanjani;Domenic Forte;M. Tehranipoor
针对安全批判性应用程序的集成电路（IC）的微探针攻击已成为一个严重的问题。借助现代电路编辑技术，攻击者可以删除材料层，并揭露带有安全信息进行探测的电线。现有的保护方法使用主动屏蔽来检测此类攻击。但是，这项技术已被证明是无效的，而触发线网层则引入了高度的成本开销。在本文中，我们调查了防止微折攻击的保护问题，并提出了一种扫描微探针漏洞的布局的方法，以便可以开发出更安全和更昂贵的保护措施。 OpenSparc T1核心布局上的示例应用用于评估提出的流程并证实发现。
Microprobing attacks against integrated circuits (IC) for security critical applications have become a serious concern. With the help of modern circuit editing techniques, an attacker could remove layers of materials and expose wires carrying security critical information for probing. Existing protection methods use active shielding to detect such attacks. However, this technique has been proven to be ineffective, while layers of trigger wire mesh introduce prohibitive cost overhead. In this paper, we investigate the problem of protection against microprobing attacks and present a method to scan layout for microprobing vulnerabilities so that more secure and less costly protections can be developed. Exemplary applications on OpenSPARC T1 core layout is used to evaluate the proposed flow and substantiate findings.