Imitation and the Incentive to Contribute Early in a Sequential Public Good Game
Imitation and the Incentive to Contribute Early in a Sequential Public Good Game
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01470.x
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发表时间：
2010-08
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
E. Cartwright;Amrish Patel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Cartwright;Amrish Patel
无论是出于互惠还是从众的动机，模仿在公益环境中很常见。我们考虑如果一个代理人期望别人模仿他，他对公共产品做出贡献的动机。使用外生排序的顺序公共产品博弈，我们表明，在序列中足够早的代理认为模仿很可能会做出贡献。通过捐款，他们期望捐款总额大幅增加。我们还表明，偏好决定了一个代理需要多早，实验中观察到的模仿者的比例足够高，足以保证贡献，群体规模的增加减少了贡献的动机。
Whether motivated by reciprocity or conformity, imitation is common in public good contexts. We consider the incentive for an agent to contribute to a public good if he expects imitation from others. Using a sequential public good game with exogenous ordering, we show that agents early enough in the sequence who believe imitation to be sufficiently likely would want to contribute. By contributing, they expect total contributions to increase significantly. We also show that preferences determine how early an agent need be, that the observed share of imitators in experiments is sufficiently high to warrant contribution and that an increase in group size reduces the incentive to contribute.