The core of a housing market with externalities
The core of a housing market with externalities
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具有外部性的房地产市场的核心
作者：
Ismail Saglam;Ayse Mumcu
众所周知，住房市场的核心总是存在的，并包含一个唯一的匹配时，代理人有独立的偏好。我们表明，当代理人的偏好是相互依赖的，有一个空的核心，以及住房市场的核心包含一个以上的匹配住房市场。
It is known that the core of a housing market always exists and contains a unique matching when agents have independent preferences. We show that when preferences of agents are interdependent, there are housing markets with an empty core as well as housing markets with a core containing more than one matching.