Procurement Auctions with General Price-Quality Evaluation
Procurement Auctions with General Price-Quality Evaluation
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发表时间：
2013
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通讯作者：
M. Hanazono;Jun Nakabayashi;Masanori Tsuruoka
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作者：
M. Hanazono;Jun Nakabayashi;Masanori Tsuruoka
我们提供了一个总体框架来研究质量问题时的采购评分拍卖。在现有的研究中，只有准线性评分规则被认为是相反的，我们的分析允许广泛的评分规则，实际上是在公共采购领域使用。我们发现，第一得分（FS）或第二得分（SS）拍卖可以转化为等价的，单维的得分出价拍卖，其中投标人的事后效用是非线性的得分出价。我们的分析表明，排名的两种拍卖格式，在预期的分数，取决于评分规则，除非评分规则是准线性的等价失败。
We oer a general framework to study procurement scoring auctions when quality matters. In contrast to the existing studies in which only quasilinear scoring rules are considered, our analysis allows a broad class of scoring rules that are practically used in the eld of public procurement. We nd that rst-score (FS) or second-score (SS) auctions can be transformed into equivalent, single-dimensional score-bid auctions where the bidder’s ex post utility is non-linear in the score-bid. Our analysis demonstrates that the ranking of the two auction formats, in terms of expected scores, depends on the scoring rule and that the equivalence fails unless scoring rules are quasilinear.