Control Rights, Network Structure and Vertical Integration: Evidence from Regional Airlines
Control Rights, Network Structure and Vertical Integration: Evidence from Regional Airlines
复制标题
控制权、网络结构和纵向一体化：来自支线航空公司的证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.845768
复制
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Mara Lederman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Silke J. Forbes;Mara Lederman
本文研究了不完全契约下纵向一体化与控制权重要性之间的关系。我们的背景是美国地区航空公司。区域航空公司以主要品牌为主要航空公司运营航班。各大航空公司将地区航空公司的航班作为自己的航班销售。在区域性公司是否由其经营的主要公司拥有方面存在很大的异质性。此外，一些石油巨头拥有一些区域合作伙伴，同时也与其他合作伙伴签订合同。我们开发了一个简单的框架，说明了一个主要的和区域之间的垂直整合的好处和成本。我们认为，当不可预见的中断产生的时间表调整的需要-经常发生在航空业-主要将内部的中断对整个网络的影响，而区域不会。区域所有权通过对区域的实物资产和劳动力的使用给予主要的控制权来缓解这种激励问题。然而，通过将该地区的劳动力“内部”，拥有一个地区可能会侵蚀一些劳动力成本的节省，这是主要航空公司取消某些航班的原因。利用2000年第二季度各专业使用区域组织的数据，我们检验了各专业对组织形式的选择是否反映了更大的控制权和更低的劳动力成本之间的权衡。我们的研究结果为我们的分析框架提供了支持。我们发现，拥有的区域更有可能为城市对（1）更多地融入主要的网络，其中外部性不内化的区域将是最大的;和（2）拥有的区域更有可能为城市对恶劣的天气条件下，不可预见的时间表中断将更常见。
This paper investigates the relationship between vertical integration and the importance of control rights under incomplete contracts. Our setting is the U.S regional airline industry. Regional airlines operate flights for major carriers under the major's brand. The majors market the regionals' flights as their own. There is substantial heterogeneity in whether or not regionals are owned by the major for which they operate. Furthermore, several majors own some of their regional partners while also contracting with others. We develop a simple framework that illustrates the benefits and costs of vertical integration between a major and regional. We argue that when unforeseen disruptions create the need for schedule adjustments - as frequently occurs in the airline industry - the major will internalize the impact of the disruption on its entire network, while the regional will not. Ownership of a regional mitigates this incentive problem by giving the major rights of control over how the regional's physical assets and labor force are used. However, by bringing the regional's labor force "in-house", ownership of a regional may erode some of the labor cost savings that are very reason why majors subcontract certain flights to regionals. Using data on majors' use of regionals in the second quarter of 2000, we test whether majors' choice of organizational form reflects this tradeoff between greater control and lower labor costs. Our results provide support for our analytical framework. We find that owned regionals are more likely to serve city pairs that are (1) more integrated into the major's network, where externalities not internalized by the regional will be the greatest; and (2) that owned regionals are more likely to serve city pairs with adverse weather conditions, where unforeseen schedule disruptions will be more common.