Affiliated Banker on Board and Conservative Accounting
Affiliated Banker on Board and Conservative Accounting
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董事会附属银行家和保守会计
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1950016
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Joseph P. Weber
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
David H. Erkens;K. Subramanyam;Jieying Zhang;Sarah E. Bonner;Alon Kalay;Joseph P. Weber
摘要：我们通过董事会代表来研究贷方监控的效果，我们将其称为保守会计中的“董事会附属银行家”（AFB）。我们假设，监督通过减少债务代理问题背后的信息不对称，减少了贷款人对通过债务契约促进的保守主义控制权转移的需求。与我们的假设一致，我们发现 AFB 公司的保守会计明显低于非 AFB 公司。这个结果对于解释可观察和不可观察因素的偏差的一系列测试来说是稳健的。我们还找到了更多证据来支持我们假设的关键要素。首先，对借款人不利的重新谈判与违反契约之间关系的研究表明，董事会代表允许贷款人根据私人信息更及时地进行重新谈判。其次，对契约强度和保守会计之间关系的审查表明，董事会代表……
ABSTRACT: We examine the effect of lender monitoring through board representation, which we label “affiliated banker on board” (AFB) on conservative accounting. We hypothesize that monitoring reduces lenders' demand for conservatism-facilitated control transfers through debt covenants by reducing the information asymmetry that underlies the agency problem of debt. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that AFB firms have markedly lower conservative accounting than non-AFB firms. This result is robust to a battery of tests that account for bias from both observable and unobservable factors. We also find additional evidence to support key elements of our hypothesis. First, an examination of the relation between borrower-unfavorable renegotiations and covenant violations suggests that board representation allows lenders to renegotiate in a timelier manner based on private information. Second, an examination of the relation between covenant intensity and conservative accounting suggests that board represent...