Bailouts and the Optimal Taxation of Bonus Pay
Bailouts and the Optimal Taxation of Bonus Pay
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救助和奖金的最佳税收
DOI：
10.1257/aer.103.3.163
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Maitreesh Ghatak
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Besley;Maitreesh Ghatak
本文认为，对金融中介机构纾困的可能性扭曲了资本的供应价格，并提出了将金融奖金与其他收入来源分开征税的论点。我们开发了一种金融合同模式，在这种模式下，中介机构竞争的是那些行为会影响金融部门生产率和风险承担的工人。这导致了次优的最优和市场均衡。与纯粹的市场结果相比，我们提出的最优税收既提高了公平，也提高了效率。
This paper argues that the possibility of bailouts to financial intermediaries distorts the supply price of capital and creates an argument for taxing financial bonuses separately from other sources of income. We develop a model of financial contracting where intermediaries compete for workers whose actions affect productivity and risk-taking in the financial sector. This derives the second-best optimum and market equilibrium. The optimal taxes that we propose increase both equity and efficiency compared to the pure market outcome.