How do CEOs Matter? The Effect of Industry Expertise on Acquisition Returns
How do CEOs Matter? The Effect of Industry Expertise on Acquisition Returns
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1647073
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发表时间：
2013-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Cláudia Custódio;Daniel J. Metzger
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文献类型：
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作者：
Cláudia Custódio;Daniel J. Metzger
本文研究了在多元化收购中，首席执行官（CEO）特征对收购方绩效的影响。当收购方的CEO在目标行业有经验时，收购方的异常公告收益比目标行业的新CEO高出1.2 - 2.0个百分点。这种结果是由行业专家首席执行官能够从合并剩余中获得更大份额的能力所驱动的。行业专家首席执行长通常会通过谈判达成更好的交易，为收购目标支付更低的溢价。与拍卖相比，当信息不对称程度较高时，在双边谈判中，这种效应更强。我们还发现，行业专家首席执行官平均会选择盈余较低的交易。这一证据与行业专家首席执行官拥有卓越的谈判技巧相一致。作者2013。牛津大学出版社代表金融研究学会出版。版权所有。有关许可，请发送电子邮件:journals.permissions@oup.com.，牛津大学出版社。
This paper shows how chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics affect the performance of acquirers in diversifying takeovers. When the acquirer's CEO has previous experience in the target industry, the acquirer's abnormal announcement returns are between 1.2 and 2.0 percentage points larger than those generated by a CEO who is new to the target industry. This outcome is driven by the industry-expert CEO's ability to capture a larger fraction of the merger surplus. Industry-expert CEOs typically negotiate better deals and pay a lower premium for the target. This effect is stronger when information asymmetry is high and in bilateral negotiations compared to auctions. We also find that industry-expert CEOs on average select lower surplus deals. This evidence is consistent with industry-expert CEOs having superior negotiation skills. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.