A game theoretical study of cooperative advertising with multiple retailers in a distribution channel
A game theoretical study of cooperative advertising with multiple retailers in a distribution channel
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DOI：
10.1007/s11518-011-5165-y
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发表时间：
2012-03
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Jihua Zhang;Jinxing Xie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jihua Zhang;Jinxing Xie
现有的合作广告研究主要考虑单一制造商-单一零售商的渠道结构。这可以提供有限的见解，因为在实际实践中，制造商通常同时与多个零售商打交道。为了检验零售商的多样性对渠道成员决策和总渠道效率的影响，本文开发了一个多零售商模型。在这个模型中，制造商和零售商玩Stackelberg博弈来做出最优的广告决策。根据定量结果可以看出：1）当存在多个对称零售商时，随着零售商数量的增加，制造商的全国广告投入对均衡渠道成员利润的贡献越来越大，但总渠道效率迅速恶化并收敛于某个值； 2）当存在多个不对称零售商时，分销渠道因零售商的搭便车行为而受到制造商统一参与策略的影响，并因制造商零售商特定参与策略而受益。本研究为所考虑的所有博弈得出封闭形式的均衡解，并明确测量不同博弈设置下渠道效率的增益/损失。
Extant studies of cooperative advertising mainly consider a single-manufacturer-single-retailer channel structure. This can provide limited insights, because a manufacturer, in real practices, usually deals with multiple retailers simultaneously. In order to examine the impact of the retailer’s multiplicity on channel members’ decisions and on total channel efficiencies, this paper develops a multiple-retailer model. In this model, the manufacturer and the retailers play a Stackelberg game to make the optimal advertising decisions. Based on the quantitative results, it is observed that: 1) When there are multiple symmetric retailers, as the number of retailers scales up, the manufacturer’s national advertising investment contributes increasingly to add to channel members’ profits in equilibrium, but the total channel efficiency deteriorates quickly and converges down to a certain value; 2) When there are multiple asymmetric retailers, the distribution channel suffers from the manufacturer’s uniform participation strategy due to the retailer’s free-riding, and benefits with the manufacturer’s retailer-specific participation strategy. This study derives equilibrium solutions in closed form for all games considered and measures explicitly the gains/losses of channel efficiencies under different game settings.