Catalytic Finance: When Does it Work?

Catalytic Finance: When Does it Work?
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催化金融:何时发挥作用?

DOI:
10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.014
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发表时间:
2003
期刊:
Yale: Cowles Foundation Working Papers
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
H. Shin
H. Shin
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
S. Morris;H. Shin

文献摘要

被引文献

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在一个部分由债权人协调失败引起的债务危机模型中,我们表明,减少事后效率低下的救助有时会增强政府采取代价高昂的调整努力的动机。这个模型有助于我们理解关于IMF在促进向发展中国家贷款方面的作用的辩论。
In a model of debt crisis caused partly by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take costly adjustment effort. This model helps us understand a debate about the role of the IMF in catalyzing lending to developing countries.