The New Materialism in Qualitative Inquiry
The New Materialism in Qualitative Inquiry
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定性探究中的新唯物主义
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Serge F. Hein
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文献类型：
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作者：
Serge F. Hein
“新唯物主义”和“新经验主义”是近年来兴起的一场重要的定性研究运动。在对定性文献中的新唯物主义和新经验主义的讨论中，德勒兹的工作经常与与这一运动直接相关的理论家的工作一起提出。我把重点放在巴拉德的作品上，她可以说是新唯物主义中最杰出的人物，并考察她的哲学与德勒兹的哲学在多大程度上是兼容的。我认为他们的本体论根本不同，因此是不可比较的：德勒兹的本体论是关于内在和差异的哲学，而巴拉德的本体论是关于超越和同一性的哲学。两位理论家也使用了一些相同的术语，但他们赋予这些术语的含义从根本上不同。德勒兹以内在论为基础的物质观与巴拉德以先验论为基础的物质观不可同日而语。他们的本体论/哲学对于定性研究也有着截然不同的含义。
The “new materialism” and “new empiricism” have recently emerged as an important movement in qualitative inquiry. In discussions of the new materialism and new empiricism in the qualitative literature, Deleuze’s work is regularly presented alongside that of theorists who are directly associated with the movement. I focus on the work of Barad, who is arguably the most prominent figure in the new materialism, and examine the extent to which her philosophy is compatible with that of Deleuze. I show that their ontologies differ fundamentally and are therefore incommensurable: Deleuze’s is a philosophy of immanence and difference, whereas Barad’s is a philosophy of transcendence and identity. Both theorists also use some of the same terms, but the meaning that they assign to each of these terms differs fundamentally. Deleuze’s immanence-based conception of matter is incommensurable with Barad’s transcendence-based conception of matter. Their ontologies/philosophies also have distinctly different implications for qualitative inquiry.