Energy efficiency and time charter rates: Energy efficiency savings recovered by ship owners in the Panamax market
Energy efficiency and time charter rates: Energy efficiency savings recovered by ship owners in the Panamax market
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DOI：
10.1016/j.tra.2014.05.004
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发表时间：
2014-08
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
P. Agnolucci;T. Smith;N. Rehmatulla
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Agnolucci;T. Smith;N. Rehmatulla
本文首次分析了节能船舶产生的财务节约如何在船东和租船者之间进行分配。这是一项重要的工作，因为财政节余的分配预计将对船东投资于更节能船舶的激励措施产生影响。我们把重点放在干散货巴拿马型船舶部分，因为它在2007年贡献了大约5000万公吨(5%)的航运二氧化碳排放总量，因此其在环境影响方面的重要性不应被忽视。定期租赁市场代表了委托代理问题的经典例子，类似于建筑业的租户-房东问题。我们发现，在2008-2012年间，能源效率带来的财务节省平均只有40%来自船东。这一发现表明，影响船东提高能效的激励措施的船东只收回了部分节余，这可能会对全球和区域两级所选择的减排政策类型产生影响。
This paper presents the first analysis on how financial savings arising from energy efficient ships are allocated between owners and those hiring the ships. This as an important undertaking as allocation of financial savings is expected to have an impact on the incentives faced by ship owners to invest in more energy efficient vessels. We focus on the dry bulk Panamax segment as it contributes to around 50 Mt (5%) of total CO2emissions from shipping in 2007 and therefore its importance in terms of environmental impact should not be neglected. The time charter market represents a classical example of the principal–agent problem similar to the tenant–landlord problem in the buildings sector. We discovered that on average only 40% of the financial savings delivered by energy efficiency accrue to ship owner for the period 2008–2012. The finding that only part of the savings are recouped by shipowners affecting their incentives towards energy efficiency could consequently have implications on the type of emission reduction policies opted at both, global and regional levels.