Regulating Bidder Participation in Auctions
Regulating Bidder Participation in Auctions
复制标题
规范投标人参与拍卖
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Andrew Sweeting
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Vivek Bhattacharya;James W. Roberts;Andrew Sweeting
与自由进入的标准拍卖形式相比，规范投标人参与拍卖可能会提高效率。我们发现，两个这样的机制，一个标准的第一价格拍卖与自由进入和进入权拍卖的相对性能，取决于非单调的信息，投标人有关于他们的成本之前，决定是否参加一个机制的精度。作为一个实证应用，我们估计参数的第一价格拍卖免费进入的桥梁建设合同在俄克拉荷马州和得克萨斯州，并预测进入权拍卖提高效率，降低采购成本显着。
Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first-price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends non-monotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first-price auctions with free entry for bridge-building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly.