Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Investors, and Corporate Governance
Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Investors, and Corporate Governance
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新兴市场企业集团、外国投资者和公司治理
DOI：
10.3386/w6955
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Palepu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Khanna;K. Palepu
我们考察了新兴市场中常见的三种集中所有者之间的相互作用：家族经营的企业集团、国内金融机构和外国金融机构。使用上世纪90年代初印度的数据，我们发现有证据表明，国内国际投资者是糟糕的监督者，而外国机构投资者是良好的监督者。虽然那些吸引外国机构投资的集团的附属公司并不比非附属公司更难监控，但我们发现，集团附属关系降低了外国机构投资的可能性。更透明的集团(集团内部金融交易的发生率较低，代表着更高的透明度)更有可能吸引此类投资。我们的结论是，集团很难监控，随着新兴市场与全球经济接轨，外国机构投资者发挥着宝贵的监控功能。
We examine the interaction between three kinds of concentrated owners commonly found in an emerging market: family-run business groups, domestic financial institutions, and foreign financial institutions. Using data from India in the early 1990s, we find evidence that domestic international investors are poor monitors, and that foreign institutional investors are good monitors. Whereas affiliates of those groups that attract foreign institutional investment are no more difficult to monitor than are unaffiliated firms, we find that group affiliation reduces the likelihood of foreign institutional investment. More transparent groups (where greater transparency is proxied for by a lower incidence of intra-group financial transactions) are more likely to attract such investment. We conclude that groups are difficult to monitor, and that foreign institutional investors serve a valuable monitoring function as emerging markets integrate with the global economy.