Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation.
Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation.
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非对称互动与超理性策略相结合可能会解决公地悲剧，而无需承认或谈判
DOI：
10.1038/srep07715
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发表时间：
2015-01-14
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Li YT
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
He JZ;Wang RW;Jensen CX;Li YT
要避免公地悲剧的发生，需要一个团体或伙伴关系中的一个或多个人“自愿”，以牺牲自己的利益为代价使团体受益。与社会伙伴的认可和谈判可以保持合作，但往往是不可能的。如果承认和谈判并不总是合作伙伴关系避免集体悲剧的机制，那么如何解释在性质上观察到的多样化的社会合作？假设个体之间的互动是不对称的，“弱的”和“强的”参与者都采用超理性策略，我们发现公地悲剧是可以避免的，而不需要承认或谈判。在志愿者的困境游戏中，理性的“强大”参与者不太可能自愿在较大的群体中提供共同利益，但我们表明，在广泛的条件下，超理性的“强大”参与者更有可能提供共同利益。这些结果暗示，超理性和不对称互动的整合可能具有解决公地悲剧的潜力。通过阐明参与者可能自愿的条件，我们阐明了在各种经过充分研究的合作社会制度中观察到的志愿服务模式，并探索了社会如何避免社会悲剧。
Avoiding the tragedy of the commons requires that one or more individuals in a group or partnership “volunteer”, benefiting the group at a cost to themselves. Recognition and negotiation with social partners can maintain cooperation, but are often not possible. If recognition and negotiation are not always the mechanism by which cooperative partnerships avoid collective tragedies, what might explain the diverse social cooperation observed in nature? Assuming that individuals interact asymmetrically and that both “weak” and “strong” players employ a super-rational strategy, we find that tragedy of the commons can be avoided without requiring either recognition or negotiation. Whereas in the volunteer's dilemma game a rational “strong” player is less likely to volunteer to provide a common good in larger groups, we show that under a wide range of conditions a super-rational “strong” player is more likely to provide a common good. These results imply that the integration of super-rationality and asymmetric interaction might have the potential to resolve the tragedy of the commons. By illuminating the conditions under which players are likely to volunteer, we shed light on the patterns of volunteerism observed in variety of well-studied cooperative social systems, and explore how societies might avert social tragedies.
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影响因子：
3.7
作者：
Abramson G;Trejo Soto CA;Oña L
通讯作者：
Oña L
影响因子：
2.5
作者：
BEECHER, MD;BEECHER, IM;HAHN, S
通讯作者：
HAHN, S
影响因子：
2.4
作者：
Helbing, Dirk;Johansson, Anders
通讯作者：
Johansson, Anders
影响因子：
3.1
作者：
DIEKMANN, A
通讯作者：
DIEKMANN, A
DOI：
10.1098/rspb.2009.1839
发表时间：
2010-05-07
影响因子：
4.7
作者：
Ang, Tzo Zen;Manica, Andrea
通讯作者：
Manica, Andrea