Bequests as a heir “discipline device”
Bequests as a heir “discipline device”
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遗赠作为继承人的“纪律手段”
DOI：
10.1007/bf00573072
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发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
P. Pestieau
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Helmuth Cremere;P. Pestieau
本文开发了道德风险和逆向选择背景下的生前礼物和遗赠模型。无私的父母并不完全知道他们的孩子为谋生付出了多少努力，也不知道他们的真实能力水平。生前赠与发生在孩子的收入实现之前，而在遗赠时，父母会观察他们。我们表明，最佳转移政策通常采用生前赠与（被认为更有效）和遗赠（被认为更具再分配性）的组合。
This paper develops a model ofinter vivosgifts and bequests in a setting of moral hazard and adverse selection. Altruistic parents do not perfectly know how much effort their children make to earn their living, nor do they know their true level of ability.Inter vivosgifts take place prior to the realization of the children's earnings whereas at the moment of bequests, parents do observe them. We show that an optimal transfer policy generally uses a mix ofinter vivosgifts — deemed as more efficient — and bequests — deemed as more redistributive.