The COVID-19 Bailouts
The COVID-19 Bailouts
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COVID-19 救助计划
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3585515
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jake Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Meier;Jake Smith
我们使用手工收集的数据来调查所有美国上市公司的 COVID-19 救助计划。接受救助的公司的税率中位数为 4%，未接受救助的公司的税率中位数为 16%。与救助公司过去缴纳的企业所得税相比，救助费用昂贵。我们计算了救助接受者必须缴纳企业所得税才能产生与救助中收到的税收收入相同的年限：薪资保护计划为 135.0 年，航空公司救助为 267.9 年。我们还记录了救助的阴暗面。对于许多公司来说，救助似乎是一笔意外之财。许多救助对象做出了有风险的财务决策，因此救助他们可能会引发道德风险。此外，游说支出可以积极预测救助的可能性和金额。
We use hand-collected data to investigate the COVID-19 bailouts for all publicly listed US firms. The median tax rate is 4% for bailout firms and 16% for no-bailout firms. The bailouts are expensive when compared to past corporate income tax payments of the bailout firms. We compute the number of years a bailout recipient has to pay corporate income tax to generate as much tax revenue as it received in bailouts: 135.0 years for the Paycheck Protection Program and 267.9 years for the airline bailouts. We also document a dark side of the bailouts. For many firms, the bailouts appear to be a windfall. Numerous bailout recipients made risky financial decisions, so bailing them out might induce moral hazard. Moreover, lobbying expenditures positively predict the bailout likelihood and amount.