Humanitarian Intervention as a Duty
Humanitarian Intervention as a Duty
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人道主义干预是一种义务
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
K. Tan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Tan
假设国际社会承诺对严重和紧急的人道主义紧急情况进行干预，正如“保护的责任”原则所表达的那样，我讨论了两个反对意见，即干预的义务仍然是一项很容易受到其他道德考虑限制的义务。一个反对意见是，鉴于个人干预成本高昂，这一义务将超出任何义务的合理限度。另一个反对意见是，任何干预义务都是不完善的义务，因此不是任何特定行为者所承担和要求的义务。我认为这些反对意见并没有损害保护责任的原则。
Assuming an international commitment to intervene in severe and urgent humanitarian emergencies, as expressed by the doctrine ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, I discuss two objections that the duty to intervene is nonetheless a duty that is easily limited by other moral considerations. One objection is that this duty will exceed the reasonable limits of any obligation given the high personal cost of intervention. The other objection is that any duty to intervene will be an imperfect duty, and therefore not a duty that is ascribed to and demandable of any specific actor. I will argue that these objections do not undermine the principle of the responsibility to protect.