Market Discipline in Banking Reconsidered: The Roles of Funding Manager Decisions and Deposit Insurance Reform
Market Discipline in Banking Reconsidered: The Roles of Funding Manager Decisions and Deposit Insurance Reform
复制标题
重新思考银行业的市场纪律：融资管理者决策和存款保险改革的作用
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.633102
复制
发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Daniel M. Covitz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Hancock;M. Kwast;Daniel M. Covitz
我们发现，银行控股公司次级债券发行利差的风险敏感性增加了监管改革，旨在减少地方政府的担保，但随后的改革，旨在减少监管宽容的一部分，下降了一些。此外，我们测试并找到一种直接形式的市场纪律的证据：债券发行惩罚相对风险银行的程度。这种纪律的证据只出现在地方政府担保减少之后的时期。
We find that the risk-sensitivity of bank holding company subordinated debt spreads at issuance increased with regulatory reforms that were designed to reduce conjectural government guarantees, but declined somewhat with subsequent reforms that were aimed in part at reducing regulatory forbearance. In addition, we test and find evidence for a straightforward form of market discipline: The extent to which bond issuance penalizes relatively risky banks. Evidence for such discipline only appears in the periods after conjectural government guarantees were reduced.