Predicting program phases and defending against side-channel attacks using hardware performance counters
Predicting program phases and defending against side-channel attacks using hardware performance counters
复制标题
使用硬件性能计数器预测程序阶段并防御旁道攻击
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jakub Szefer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Junaid Nomani;Jakub Szefer
两个应用程序共享处理器内部的功能单元可能导致信息泄露和微架构侧通道攻击。与此同时，现在的处理器通常都带有硬件性能计数器，可以统计从高速缓存行为到浮点运算单元使用情况等各种微体系结构事件。在本文中，我们提出操作系统的调度程序可以利用硬件性能计数器来预测系统上运行的应用程序即将进入的程序阶段。通过检测和预测程序阶段，调度程序可以确保处于相同程序阶段（即使用相同类型的功能单元）的程序不会被调度到相同的处理器内核上，从而帮助减少潜在的侧信道攻击。
Sharing of functional units inside a processor by two applications can lead to to information leaks and micro-architectural side-channel attacks. Meanwhile, processors now commonly come with hardware performance counters which can count a variety of micro-architectural events, ranging from cache behavior to floating point unit usage. In this paper we propose that the hardware performance counters can be leveraged by the operating system's scheduler to predict the upcoming program phases of the applications running on the system. By detecting and predicting program phases, the scheduler can make sure that programs in the same program phase, i.e. using same type of functional unit, are not scheduled on the same processor core, thus helping to mitigate potential side-channel attacks.